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Abstract
We propose a framework for studying optimal market making policies in a limit
order book (LOB). The bid-ask spread of the LOB is modelled by a Markov chain with
finite values, multiple of the tick size, and subordinated by the Poisson process of the
tick-time clock. We consider a small agent who continuously submits limit buy/sell
orders at best bid/ask quotes, and may also set limit orders at best bid (resp. ask) plus
(resp. minus) a tick for getting the execution order priority, which is a crucial issue in
high frequency trading. By trading with limit orders, the agent faces an execution risk
since her orders are executed only when they meet counterpart market orders, which
are modelled by Cox processes with intensities depending on the spread and on her
limit prices. By holding non-zero positions on the risky asset, the agent is also subject
to the inventory risk related to price volatility. Then the agent can also choose to trade
with market orders, and therefore get immediate execution, but at a least favorable
price because she has to cross the bid-ask spread.
The objective of the market maker is to maximize her expected utility from re-
venue over a short term horizon by a tradeoff between limit and market orders, while
controlling her inventory position. This is formulated as a mixed regime switching re-
gular/impulse control problem that we characterize in terms of quasi-variational system
by dynamic programming methods. In the case of a mean-variance criterion with
martingale reference price or when the asset price follows a Levy process and with
exponential utility criterion, the dynamic programming system can be reduced to a
system of simple equations involving only the inventory and spread variables.
Calibration procedures are derived for estimating the transition matrix and inten-
sity parameters for the spread and for Cox processes modelling the execution of limit
orders. Several computational tests are performed both on simulated and real data,
and illustrate the impact and profit when considering execution priority in limit orders
and market orders.
Keywords: Market making, limit order book, inventory risk, point process, stochastic
control.
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1 Introduction
Most of modern equity exchanges are organized as order driven markets. In such type of
markets, the price formation exclusively results from operating a limit order book (LOB), an
order crossing mechanism where limit orders are accumulated while waiting to be matched
with incoming market orders. Any market participant is able to interact with the LOB by
posting either market orders or limit orders1.
In this context, market making is a class of strategies that consists in simultaneously
posting limit orders to buy and sell during the continuous trading session. By doing so,
market makers provide counterpart to any incoming market orders: suppose that an investor
A wants to sell one share of a given security at time t and that an investor B wants to buy
one share of this security at time t′ > t; if both use market orders, the economic role of the
market maker C is to buy the stock as the counterpart of A at time t, and carry until date t′
when she will sell the stock as a counterpart of B. The revenue that C obtains for providing
this service to final investors is the difference between the two quoted prices at ask (limit
order to sell) and bid (limit order to buy), also called the market maker’s spread. This role
was traditionally fulfilled by specialist firms, but, due to widespread adoption of electronic
trading systems, any market participant is now able to compete for providing liquidity.
Moreover, as pointed out by empirical studies (e.g. [11],[9]) and in a recent review [7] from
AMF, the French regulator, this renewed competition among liquidity providers causes
reduced effective market spreads, and therefore reduced indirect costs for final investors.
Empirical studies (e.g. [11]) also described stylized features of market making strategies.
First, market making is typically not directional, in the sense that it does not profit from
security price going up or down. Second, market makers keep almost no overnight position,
and are unwilling to hold any risky asset at the end of the trading day. Finally, they manage
to maintain their inventory, i.e. their position on the risky asset close to zero during the
trading day, and often equilibrate their position on several distinct marketplaces, thanks to
the use of high-frequency order sending algorithms. Estimations of total annual profit for
this class of strategy over all U.S. equity market were around 10 G$ in 2009 [7].
Popular models of market making strategies were set up using a risk-reward approach.
Three distinct sources of risk are usually identified: the inventory risk, the adverse selection
risk and the execution risk. The inventory risk [1] is comparable to the market risk, i.e.
the risk of holding a long or short position on a risky asset. Moreover, due to the uncertain
execution of limit orders, market makers only have partial control on their inventory, and
therefore the inventory has a stochastic behavior. The adverse selection risk, popular in
economic and econometric litterature, is the risk that market price unfavourably deviates,
from the market maker point of view, after their quote was taken. This type of risk
1A market order of size m is an order to buy (sell) m units of the asset being traded at the lowest
(highest) available price in the market, its execution is immediate; a limit order of size ℓ at price q is an
order to buy (sell) ℓ units of the asset being traded at the specified price q, its execution is uncertain and
achieved only when it meets a counterpart market order. Given a security, the best bid (resp. ask) price
is the highest (resp. lowest) price among limit orders to buy (resp. to sell) that are active in the LOB.
The spread is the difference, expressed in nume´raire per share, of the best ask price and the best bid price,
positive during the continuous trading session (see [6]).
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appears naturally in models where the market orders flow contains information about the
fundamental asset value (e.g. [5]). Finally, the execution risk is the risk that limit orders
may not be executed, or be partially executed [10]. Indeed, given an incoming market
order, the matching algorithm of LOB determines which limit orders are to be executed
according to a price/time priority2, and this structure fundamentally impacts the dynamics
of executions.
Some of these risks were studied in previous works. The seminal work [1] provided
a framework to manage inventory risk in a stylized LOB. The market maker objective
is to maximize the expected utility of her terminal profit, in the context of limit orders
executions occurring at jump times of Poisson processes. This model shows its efficiency to
reduce inventory risk, measured via the variance of terminal wealth, against the symmetric
strategy. Several extensions and refinement of this setup can be found in recent litterature:
[8] provides simplified solution to the backward optimization, an in-depth discussion of its
characteristics and an application to the liquidation problem. In [2], the authors develop a
closely related model to solve a liquidation problem, and study continuous limit case. The
paper [3] provides a way to include more precise empirical features to this framework by
embedding a hidden Markov model for high frequency dynamics of LOB. Some aspects of
the execution risk were also studied previously, mainly by considering the trade-off between
passive and aggressive execution strategies. In [10], the authors solve the Merton’s portfolio
optimization problem in the case where the investor can choose between market orders or
limit orders; in [13], the possibility to use market orders in addition to limit orders is also
taken into account, in the context of market making in the foreign exchange market. Yet
the relation between execution risk and the microstructure of the LOB, and especially the
price/time priority is, so far, poorly investigated.
In this paper we develop a new model to address these three sources of risk. The stock
mid-price is driven by a general Markov process, and we model the market spread as a
discrete Markov chain that jumps according to a stochastic clock. Therefore, the spread
takes discrete values in the price grid, multiple of the tick size. We allow the market maker
to trade both via limit orders, which execution is uncertain, and via market orders, which
execution is immediate but costly. The market maker can post limit orders at best quote
or improve this quote by one tick. In this last case, she hopes to capture market order
flow of agents who are not yet ready to trade at the best bid/ask quote. Therefore, she
faces a trade off between waiting to be executed at the current best price, or improve
this best price, and then be more rapidly executed but at a less favorable price. We
model the limit orders strategy as continuous controls, due to the fact that these orders
can be updated at high frequency at no cost. On the contrary, we model the market
orders strategy as impulse controls that can only occur at discrete dates. We also include
fixed, per share or proportional fees or rebates coming with each execution. Execution
processes, counting the number of executed limit orders, are modelled as Cox processes
with intensity depending both on the market maker’s controls and on the market spread.
In this context, we optimize the expected utility from profit over a finite time horizon,
2A different type of LOB operates under pro-rata priority, e.g. for some futures on interest rates. In this
paper, we do not consider this case and focus on the main mechanism used in equity market.
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by choosing optimally between limit and market orders, while controlling the inventory
position. We study in detail classical frameworks including mean-variance criterion and
exponential utility criterion.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we detail the model, and comment
its features. We also provide direct calibration methods for all quantities involved in our
model. We formulate in Section 3 the optimal market making control problem and derive the
associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman quasi variational inequality (HJBQVI) from dynamic
programming principle. We show how one can reduce the number of state variables to
the inventory and spread for the resolution to this QVI in two standard cases. In the last
section 4, we provide some numerical results and empirical performance analysis.
2 A market-making model
2.1 Mid price and spread process
Let us fix a probability space (Ω,F ,P) equipped with a filtration F = (Ft)t≥0 satisfying
the usual conditions. It is assumed that all random variables and stochastic processes are
defined on the stochastic basis (Ω,F ,F,P).
The mid-price of the stock is an exogenous Markov process P , with infinitesimal ge-
nerator P and state space P. For example, P is a Le´vy process (e.g. an arithmetic Brownian
motion), or an exponential of Le´vy process (e.g. geometric Brownian motion). In the limit
order book (LOB) for this stock, we consider a stochastic bid-ask spread resulting from the
behaviour of market participants, taking discrete values, which are finite multiple of the
tick size δ > 0, and jumping at random times. This is modelled as follows: we first consider
the tick time clock associated to a Poisson process (Nt)t with deterministic intensity λ(t),
and representing the random times where the buy and sell orders of participants in the
market affect the bid-ask spread. We next define a discrete-time stationary Markov chain
(Sˆn)n∈N, valued in the finite state space S = δIm, Im := {1, . . . ,m}, m ∈ N \ {0}, with
probability transition matrix (ρij)1≤i,j≤M , i.e. P[Sˆn+1 = jδ|Sˆn = iδ] = ρij , s.t. ρii = 0,
independent of N , and representing the random spread in tick time. The spread process
(St)t in calendar time is then defined as the time-change of Sˆ by N , i.e.
St = SˆNt , t ≥ 0. (2.1)
Hence, (St)t is a continuous time (inhomogeneous) Markov chain with intensity matrix R(t)
= (rij(t))1≤i,j≤m, where rij(t) = λ(t)ρij for i 6= j, and rii(t) = −
∑
j 6=i rij(t). We assume
that S and P are independent. The best-bid and best-ask prices are defined by: P bt =
Pt −
St
2 , P
a
t = Pt +
St
2 .
2.2 Trading strategies in the limit order book
We consider an agent (market maker), who trades the stock using either limit orders or
market orders. She may submit limit buy (resp. sell) orders specifying the quantity and
the price she is willing to pay (resp. receive) per share, but will be executed only when
an incoming sell (resp. buy) market order is matching her limit order. Otherwise, she can
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post market buy (resp. sell) orders for an immediate execution, but, in this case obtain
the opposite best quote, i.e. trades at the best-ask (resp. best bid) price, which is less
favorable.
Limit orders strategies. The agent may submit at any time limit buy/sell orders at the
current best bid/ask prices (and then has to wait an incoming counterpart market order
matching her limit), but also control her own bid and ask price quotes by placing buy (resp.
sell) orders at a marginal higher (resp. lower) price than the current best bid (resp. ask),
i.e. at P
b+
t := P
b
t + δ (resp. P
a−
t := P
a
t − δ). Such an alternative choice is used in practice
by a market maker to capture market orders flow of undecided traders at the best quotes,
hence to get priority in the order execution w.r.t. limit order at current best/ask quotes,
and can be taken into account in our modelling with discrete spread of tick size δ.
There is then a tradeoff between a larger performance for a quote at the current best
bid (resp. ask) price, and a smaller performance for a quote at a higher bid price, but
with faster execution. The submission and cancellation of limit orders are for free, as they
provide liquidity to the market, and are thus stimulated. Actually, market makers receive
some fixed rebate once their limit orders are executed. The agent is assumed to be small
in the sense that she does not influence the bid-ask spread. The limit order strategies are
then modelled by a continuous time predictable control process:
αmaket = (Q
b
t , Q
a
t , L
b
t , L
a
t ), t ≥ 0,
where L = (Lb, La) valued in [0, ℓ¯]2, ℓ¯ > 0, represents the size of the limit buy/sell order,
and Q = (Qb, Qa) represent the possible choices of the bid/ask quotes either at best or
at marginally improved prices, and valued in Q = Qb × Qa, with Qb = {Bb,Bb+}, Q
a =
{Ba,Ba−}:
• Bb: best-bid quote, and Bb+: bid quote at best price plus the tick
• Ba: best-ask quote, and Ba−: ask quote at best price minus the tick
Notice that when the spread is equal to one tick δ, a bid quote at best price plus the tick is
actually equal to the best ask, and will then be considered as a buy market order. Similarly,
an ask quote at best price minus the tick becomes a best bid, and is then viewed as a sell
market order. In other words, the limit orders Qt = (Q
b
t , Q
a
t ) take values in Q(St−), where
Q(s) = Qb ×Qa when s > δ, Q(s) = {Bb} × {Ba} when s = δ. We shall denote by Qbi =
Qb for i > 1, and Qbi = {Bb} for i = 1, and similarly for Q
a
i for i ∈ Im.
We denote at any time t by πb(Qbt , Pt, St) and π
a(Qat , Pt, St) the bid and ask prices of
the market maker, where the functions πb (resp. πa) are defined on Qb × P × S (resp.
Qa × P× S) by:
πb(qb, p, s) =
{
p− s2 , for q
b = Bb
p− s2 + δ for q
b = Bb+.
πa(qa, p, s) =
{
p+ s2 , for q
a = Ba
p+ s2 − δ for q
a = Ba−.
We shall denote by πbi (q
b, p) = πb(qb, p, s), πai (q
a, p) = πa(qa, p, s) for s = iδ, i ∈ Im.
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Remark 2.1 One can take into account proportional rebates received by the market ma-
kers, by considering; πb(qb, p, s) = (p − s2 + δ1qb=Bb+)(1 − ρ), π
a(qa, p, s) = (p + s2 −
δ1qa=Ba−)(1 + ρ), for some ρ ∈ [0, 1), or per share rebates with: π
b(qb, p, s) = p − s2 +
δ1qb=Bb+ − ρ, π
a(qa, p, s) = p+ s2 − δ1qa=Ba− + ρ, for some ρ > 0.
The limit orders of the agent are executed when they meet incoming counterpart market
orders. Let us then consider the arrivals of market buy and market sell orders, which
completely match the limit sell and limit buy orders of the small agent, and modelled by
independent Cox processes Na and N b. The intensity rate of Nat is given by λ
a(Qat , St)
where λa is a deterministic function of the limit quote sell order, and of the spread, satisfying
λa(Ba, s) < λa(Ba−, s). This natural condition conveys the price/priority in the order
execution in the sense that an agent quoting a limit sell order at ask price P a− will be
executed before traders at the higher ask price P a, and hence receive more often market buy
orders. Typically, one would also expect that λa is nonincreasing w.r.t. the spread, which
means that the larger is the spread, the less often the market buy orders arrive. Likewise,
we assume that the intensity rate of N bt is given by λ
b(Qbt , St) where λ
b is a deterministic
function of the spread, and λb(Bb, s) < λb(Bb+, s). We shall denote by λ
a
i (q
a) = λa(qa, s),
λbi(q
b) = λb(qb, s) for s = iδ, i ∈ Im.
For a limit order strategy αmake = (Qb, Qa, Lb, La), the cash holdings X and the number
of shares Y hold by the agent (also called inventory) follow the dynamics
dYt = L
b
tdN
b
t − L
a
t dN
a
t , (2.2)
dXt = −π
b(Qbt , Pt− , St−)L
b
tdN
b
t + π
a(Qat , Pt− , St−)L
a
t dN
a
t . (2.3)
Market order strategies. In addition to market making strategies, the investor may
place market orders for an immediate execution reducing her inventory. The submissions
of market orders, in contrast to limit orders, take liquidity in the market, and are usually
subject to fees. We model market order strategies by an impulse control:
αtake = (τn, ζn)n≥0,
where (τn) is an increasing sequence of stopping times representing the market order decision
times of the investor, and ζn, n ≥ 1, are Fτn-measurable random variables valued in [−e¯, e¯],
e¯ > 0, and giving the number of stocks purchased at the best-ask price if ζn ≥ 0, or selled
at the best-bid price if ζn < 0 at these times. Again, we assumed that the agent is small
so that her total market order will be executed immediately at the best bid or best ask
price. In other words, we only consider a linear market impact, which does not depend on
the order size. When posting a market order strategy, the cash holdings and the inventory
jump at times τn by:
Yτn = Yτ−n + ζn, (2.4)
Xτn = Xτ−n − c(ζn, Pτn , Sτn) (2.5)
where
c(e, p, s) = ep+ |e|
s
2
+ ε
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represents the (algebraic) cost function indicating the amount to be paid immediately when
passing a market order of size e, given the mid price p, a spread s, and a fixed fee ε > 0.
We shall denote by ci(e, p) = c(e, p, s) for s = iδ, i ∈ Im.
Remark 2.2 One can also include proportional fees ρ ∈ [0, 1) paid at each market order
trading by considering a cost function in the form: c(e, p, s) = (e+ ε|e|)p+ (|e|+ ρe) s2 + ε,
or fixed fees per share with c(e, p, s) = ep+ |e|( s2 + ρ) + ε.
In the sequel, we shall denote by A the set of all limit/market order trading strategies
α = (αmake, αtake).
2.3 Parameters estimation
In most order-driven markets, available data are made up of Level 1 data that contain
transaction prices and quantities at best quotes, and of Level 2 data containing the volume
updates for the liquidity offered at the L first order book slices (L usually ranges from 5
to 10). In this section, we propose some direct methods for estimating the intensity of the
spread Markov chain, and of the execution point processes, based only on the observation of
Level 1 data. This has the advantage of low computational cost, since we do not have to deal
with the whole volume of Level 2 data. Yet, we mention some recent work on parameters
estimation from the whole order book data [4], but involving heavier computations based
on integral transforms.
Estimation of spread parameters. Assuming that the spread S is observable, let us
define the jump times of the spread process:
θ0 = 0, θn+1 = inf {t > θn : St 6= St−} , ∀n ≥ 1.
From these observable quantities, one can reconstruct the processes:
Nt = # {θj > 0 : θj ≤ t} , t ≥ 0,
Sˆn = Sθn , n ≥ 0.
Then, our goal is to estimate the deterministic intensity of the Poisson process (Nt)t, and
the transition matrix of the Markov chain (Sˆn)n from a path realization with high frequency
data of the tick-time clock and spread in tick time over a finite trading time horizon T ,
typically of one day. From the observations of K samples of Sˆn, n = 1, . . . ,K, and since the
Markov chain (Sˆn) is stationary, we have a consistent estimator (whenK goes to infinity) for
the transition probability ρij := P[Sˆn+1 = jδ|Sˆn = iδ] = P[(Sˆn+1, Sˆn) = (jδ, iδ)]/P[Sˆn =
iδ] given by:
ρˆij =
K∑
n=1
1{(Sˆn+1,Sˆn)=(jδ,iδ)}
K∑
n=1
1{Sˆn=iδ}
(2.6)
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For the estimation of the deterministic intensity function λ(t) of the (non)homogeneous
Poisson process (Nt), we shall assume in a first approximation a simple natural parametric
form. For example, we may assume that λ is constant over a trading day, and more
realistically for taking into account intra-day seasonality effects, we consider that the tick
time clock intensity jumps e.g. every hour of a trading day. We then assume that λ is in
the form:
λ(t) =
∑
λk1{tk≤t<tk+1}
where (tk)k is a fixed and known increasing finite sequence of R+ with t0 = 0, and (λk)k is
an unknown finite sequence of (0,∞). In other words, the intensity is constant equal to λk
over each period [tk, tk+1], and by assuming that the interval length tk+1− tk is large w.r.t.
the intensity λk (which is the case for high frequency data), we have a consistent estimator
of λk, for all k, and then of λ(t) given by:
λˆk =
Ntk+1 −Ntk
tk+1 − tk
. (2.7)
We performed these two estimation procedures (2.6) and (2.7) on SOGN.PA stock on
April 18, 2011 between 9:30 and 16:30 in Paris local time. We used tick-by-tick level 1 data
provided by Quanthouse, and fed via a OneTick Timeseries database.
In table 1, we display the estimated transition matrix: first row and column indicate
the spread value s = iδ and the the cell ij shows ρˆij . For this stock and at this date, the
tick size was δ = 0.005 euros, and we restricted our analysis to the first 6 values of the
spread (m = 6) due to the small number of data outside this range.
spread 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02 0.025 0.03
0.005 0 0.410 0.220 0.160 0.142 0.065
0.01 0.201 0 0.435 0.192 0.103 0.067
0.015 0.113 0.221 0 0.4582 0.147 0.059
0.02 0.070 0.085 0.275 0 0.465 0.102
0.025 0.068 0.049 0.073 0.363 0 0.446
0.03 0.077 0.057 0.059 0.112 0.692 0
Table 1: Estimation of the transition matrix (ρij) for the underlying spread of the stock
SOGN.PA on April 18, 2011.
In table 2, we display the estimate for the tick time clock intensity λ(t) by assuming
that it is piecewise constant and jumps only at 10:30, 11:30, ..., 16:30 in Paris local time.
In figure 1, we plot the tick time clock intensity by using an affine interpolation, and
observed a typical U-pattern. Hence, a further step for the estimation of the intensity
could be to specify a parametric form for the intensity function fitting U pattern, e.g.
parabolic functions in time, and then use a maximum likelihood method for estimating the
parameters.
Estimation of execution parameters. When performing a limit order strategy αmake,
we suppose that the market maker permanently monitors her execution point processes
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Time 10:30 11:30 12:30 13:30 14:30 15:30 16:30
Clock Intensity λ(t) 1.654 0.799 0.516 0.377 0.632 1.305 2.113
Table 2: Estimation of the tick time clock (hourly basis) for the stock SOGN.PA on April
18, 2011. Tick time clock intensity λ(t) is expressed in second−1.
1.5
2
2.5
0
0.5
1
10:30:00 AM 11:30:00 AM 12:30:00 PM 1:30:00 PM 2:30:00 PM 3:30:00 PM 4:30:00 PM
Figure 1: Plot of tick time clock intensity estimate for the stock SOGN.PA on April 18,
2011 expressed in second−1 (affine interpolation).
Na and N b, representing respectively the number of arrivals of market buy and sell orders
matching the limit orders for quote ask Qa and quote bid Qb. We also assume that there
is no latency so that the observation of the execution processes is not noisy. Therefore,
observable variables include the quintuplet:
(Nat , N
b
t , Q
a
t , Q
b
t , St) ∈ R
+ × R+ ×Qa ×Qb × S , t ∈ [0, T ]
Moreover, since Na and N b are assumed to be independent, and both sides of the order
book can be estimated using the same procedure, we shall focus on the estimation for the
intensity function λb(qb, s), qb ∈ Qb = {Bb,Bb+}, s ∈ S = δIm, of the Cox process N
b.
The estimation procedure for λb(qb, s) basically matchs the intuition that one must count
the number of executions at bid when the system was in the state (qb, s) and normalize this
quantity by the time spent in the state (qb, s). This is justified mathematically as follows.
For any (qb, s = iδ) ∈ Qb × S, let us define the point process
N b,q
b,i
t =
∫ t
0
1{Qbu=q,Su−=iδ}dN
b
u, t ≥ 0,
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which counts the number of jumps of N b when (Qb, S) was in state (qb, s = iδ). Then, for
any nonnegative predictable process (Ht), we have
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
HtdN
b,qb,i
t
]
= E
[ ∫ ∞
0
Ht1{Qbt=qb,St−=iδ}
dN bt
]
= E
[ ∫ ∞
0
Ht1{Qbt=qb,St−=iδ}
λb(Qbt , St)dt
]
= E
[ ∫ ∞
0
Ht1{Qbt=qb,St−=iδ}
λbi(q
b)dt
]
, (2.8)
where we used in the second equality the fact that λb(Qbt , St) is the intensity of N
b. The
relation (2.8) means that the point process N b,q
b,i admits for intensity λbi(q
b)1{Qbt=qb,St−=iδ}
.
By defining
T b,q
b,i
t =
∫ t
0
1{Qbu=q,Su−=iδ}du
as the time that (Qb, S) spent in the state (qb, s = iδ), this means equivalently that the
process M b,q
b,i
t = N
b,qb,i
A
b,qb,i
t
, where Ab,q
b,i
t = inf{u ≥ 0 : T
b,qb,i
u ≥ t} is the ca`d-la`g inverse of
T b,q
b,i, is a Poisson process with intensity λi(q
b). By assuming that T b,q
b,i
T is large w.r.t.
λi(q
b), which is the case when (Sˆn) is irreducible (hence recurrent), and for high-frequency
data over [0, T ], we have a consistent estimator of λbi(q
b) given by:
λˆbi(q
b) =
N b,q
b,i
T
T b,q
b,i
T
. (2.9)
Similarly, we have a consistent estimator for λai (q
a) given by:
λˆai (q
a) =
Na,q
a,i
T
T a,q
a,i
T
, (2.10)
where Na,q
a,i
T counts the number of executions at ask quote q
a and for a spread iδ, and
T a,q
a,i
T is the time that (Q
a, S) spent in the state (qa, s = iδ) over [0, T ].
Let us now illustrate this estimation procedure on real data, with the same market data
as above, i.e. tick-by-tick level 1 for SOGN.PA on April 18, 2011, provided by Quanthouse
via OneTick timeseries database. Actually, since we did not perform the strategy on this
real-world order book, we could not observe the real execution processes N b and Na. We
built thus simple proxies N˜ b,q
b,i and N˜a,q
a,i, for qb = Bb,Bb+, q
a = Ba,Ba−, i = 1, . . . ,m,
based on the following rules. Let us also assume that in addition to (Sθn)n, we observe at
jump times θn of the spread, the volumes (V
a
θn
, V bθn) offered at the best ask and best bid
price in the LOB together with the cumulated market order quantities ϑBUYθn+1 and ϑ
SELL
θn+1
arriving between two consecutive jump times θn and θn+1 of the spread, respectively at
best ask price and best bid price. We finally fix an arbitrarily typical volume V0, e.g. V0 =
10
100 of our limit orders, and define the proxys N˜ b,q
b,i and N˜a,q
a,i at times θn by:
N˜
b,Bb+,i
θn+1
= N˜
b,Bb+,i
θn
+ 1{
V0<ϑ
SELL
θn+1
,Sθn=iδ
} , N˜ b,Bb+,i0 = 0
N˜ b,Bb,iθn+1 = N˜
b,Bb+,i
θn
+ 1{
V0+V bθn<ϑ
SELL
θn+1
,Sθn=iδ
} , N˜ b,Bb,i0 = 0
N˜
a,Aa−,i
θn+1
= N˜
a,Aa−,i
θn
+ 1{
V0<ϑ
BUY
θn+1
,Sθn=iδ
} , N˜a,Aa−,i0 = 0
N˜a,Aa,iθn+1 = N˜
b,Aa,i
θn
+ 1{
V0+V aθn<ϑ
BUY
θn+1
,Sθn=iδ
} , N˜a,Aa,i0 = 0,
together with a proxy for the time spent in spread iδ:
T˜ iθn+1 = T˜
i
θn
+ (θn+1 − θn)1{Sθn=iδ}, T˜
i
0 = 0.
The interpretation of these proxies is the following: we consider the case where the (small)
market maker instantaneously updates her quote Qb (resp. Qa) and volume Lb ≤ V0 (resp.
La ≤ V0) only when the spread changes exogenously, i.e. at dates (θn), so that the spread
remains constant between her updates, not considering her own quotes. If she chooses to
improve best price i.e Qbθn = Bb+ (resp. Q
a
θn
= Ba−) she will be in top priority in the
LOB and therefore captures all incoming market order flow to sell (resp. buy). Therefore,
an unfavourable way for (under)-estimating her number of executions is to increment N˜ b
(resp. N˜a) only when total traded volume at bid ξSELLθn+1 (resp. total volume traded at ask
ξBUYθn+1 ) was greater than V0. If the market maker chooses to add liquidity to the best prices
i.e. Qbθn = Bb (resp. Q
a
θn
= Ba), she will be ranked behind V bθn (resp. V
a
θn
) in LOB priority
queue. Therefore, we increment N˜ b (resp. N˜a) only when the total traded volume at bid
ϑSELLθn+1 (resp. total volume traded at ask ϑ
BUY
θn+1
) was greater than V0+V
b
θn
(resp. V0+V
a
θn
).
We then provide a proxy estimate for λbi(q
b), λai (q
a) by:
λ˜bi(q
b) =
N˜ b,q
b,i
θn
T˜ iθn
, λ˜ai (q
a) =
N˜a,q
a,i
θn
T˜ iθn
. (2.11)
We performed the estimation procedure (2.11). In table 3 we computed λ˜ai (q
a) and
λ˜bi(q
b) for i = 1, . . . , 6, and limit order quotes qb = Bb+, Bb, q
a = Ba,Ba−. Due to the
lack of data, estimate for large values of the spread are less robust. In this table, each row
corresponds to a choice of the spread and each column to a choice of the quotes.
In figure 2 we plotted this estimated intensity as a function of the spread, i.e. s = iδ →
λ˜bi(q
b), λ˜ai (q
a) for qb ∈ Qb, and qa ∈ Qa. As one would expect, (λ˜ai (.), λ˜
b
i(.)) are decreasing
functions of i for the small values of i which matches the intuition that the higher are the
(indirect) costs, the smaller is market order flow. Surprisingly, for large values of i this
function becomes increasing, which can be due either to an estimation error, caused by the
lack of data for this spread range, or a “gaming” effect, in other word liquidity providers
increasing their spread when large or autocorrelated market orders come in.
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Ba Ba- Bb Bb+
0.005 0.0539 0.1485 0.0718 0.1763
0.010 0.0465 0.0979 0.0520 0.1144
0.015 0.0401 0.0846 0.0419 0.0915
0.020 0.0360 0.0856 0.0409 0.0896
0.025 0.0435 0.1009 0.0452 0.0930
0.030 0.0554 0.1202 0.0614 0.1255
Table 3: Estimate of execution intensities λ˜ai (q
a) and λ˜bi(q
b), expressed in s−1 for SOGN.PA
on April 18, 2011, between 9:30 and 16:30 Paris local time. Each row corresponds to a
spread value as a multiple of δ = 0.005. Each column corresponds to a limit order quote.
Figure 2: Plot of execution intensities estimate as a function of the spread for the stock
SOGN.PA on the 18/04/2011, expressed in s−1 (affine interpolation).
3 Optimal limit/market order strategies
3.1 Control problem formulation
Our market model in the previous section is completely determined by the state variables
(X,Y, P, S) controlled by the limit/marker order trading strategies α ∈ A.
The objective of the market maker is the following. She wants to maximize over a
finite horizon T the profit from her transactions in the LOB, while keeping under control
her inventory (usually starting from zero), and getting rid of her inventory at the terminal
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date:
maximize E
[
U(XT )− γ
∫ T
0
g(Yt)dt
]
(3.1)
over all limit/market order trading strategies α = (αmake, αtake) in A such that YT = 0.
Here U is an increasing reward function, γ is a nonnegative constant, and g is a nonnegative
convex function, so that the last integral term
∫ T
0 g(Yt)dt penalizes the variations of the
inventory. Typical frameworks include the two following cases:
• Mean-quadratic criterion: U(x) = x, γ > 0, g(y) = y2.
• Exponential utility maximization: U(x) = − exp(−ηx), γ = 0.
Let us first remove mathematically the terminal constraint on the inventory: YT = 0,
by introducing the liquidation function L(x, y, p, s) defined on R2 × P× S by:
L(x, y, p, s) = x− c(−y, p, s) = x+ yp− |y|
s
2
− ε.
This represents the value that an investor would obtained by liquidating immediately by a
market order her inventory position y in stock, given a cash holdings x, a mid-price p and
a spread s. Then, problem (3.1) is formulated equivalently as
maximize E
[
U(L(XT , YT , PT , ST ))− γ
∫ T
0
g(Yt)dt
]
(3.2)
over all limit/market order trading strategies α = (αmake, αtake) in A. Indeed, the maximal
value of problem (3.1) is clearly smaller than the one of problem (3.2) since for any α ∈ A
s.t. YT = 0, we have L(XT , YT , PT , ST ) = XT . Conversely, given an arbitrary α ∈ A, let
us consider the control α˜ ∈ A, coinciding with α up to time T , and to which one add at
the terminal date T the market order consisting in liquidating all the inventory YT . The
associated state process (X˜, Y˜ , P, S) satisfies: X˜t = Xt, Y˜t = Yt for t < T , and X˜T =
L(XT , YT , PT , ST ), Y˜T = 0. This shows that the maximal value of problem (3.2) is smaller
and then equal to the maximal value of problem (3.1).
We then define the value function for problem (3.2) (or (3.1)):
v(t, z, s) = sup
α∈A
Et,z,s
[
U(L(ZT , ST ))− γ
∫ T
t
g(Yu)du
]
(3.3)
for t ∈ [0, T ], z = (x, y, p) ∈ R2 × P, s ∈ S. Here, given α ∈ A, Et,z,s denotes the ex-
pectation operator under which the process (Z, S) = (X,Y, P, S) solution to (2.1)-(2.2)-
(2.3)-(2.4)-(2.5), with initial state (Zt− , St−) = (z, s), is taken. Problem (3.3) is a mixed
regular/impulse control problem in a regime switching jump-diffusion model, that we shall
study by dynamic programming methods. Since the spread takes finite values in S = δIm,
it will be convenient to denote for i ∈ Im, by vi(t, z) = v(t, z, iδ). By misuse of notation,
we shall often identify the value function with the Rm-valued function v = (vi)i∈Im defined
on [0, T ]× R2 × P.
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3.2 Dynamic programming equation
For any q = (qb, qa) ∈ Q, ℓ = (ℓb, ℓa) ∈ [0, ℓ¯]2, we consider the second-order nonlocal
operator:
Lq,ℓϕ(t, x, y, p, s) = Pϕ(t, x, y, p, s) +R(t)ϕ(t, x, y, p, s)
+ λb(qb, s)
[
ϕ(t,Γb(x, y, p, s, qb, ℓb), p, s)− ϕ(t, x, y, p, s)
]
+ λa(qa, s)
[
ϕ(t,Γa(x, y, p, s, qa, ℓa), p, s)− ϕ(t, x, y, p, s)
]
, (3.4)
for (t, x, y, p, s) ∈ [0, T ]× R2 × P× S, where
R(t)ϕ(t, x, y, p, s) =
m∑
j=1
rij(t)
[
ϕ(t, x, y, p, jδ)− ϕ(t, x, y, p, iδ)
]
, for s = iδ, i ∈ Im,
and Γb (resp. Γa) is defined from R2 × P× S×Qb ×R+ (resp. R
2 × P× S×Qa ×R+ into
R
2) by
Γb(x, y, p, s, qb, ℓb) = (x− πb(qb, p, s)ℓb, y + ℓb)
Γa(x, y, p, s, qa, ℓa) = (x+ πa(qa, p, s)ℓa, y − ℓa).
The first term of Lq,ℓ in (3.4) correspond to the infinitesimal generator of the diffusion
mid-price process P , the second one is the generator of the continuous-time spread Markov
chain S, and the two last terms correspond to the nonlocal operator induced by the jumps
of the cash process X and inventory process Y when applying an instantaneous limit order
control (Qt, Lt) = (q, ℓ).
Let us also consider the impulse operator associated to market order control, and defined
by
Mϕ(t, x, y, p, s) = sup
e∈[−e¯,e¯]
ϕ(t,Γtake(x, y, p, s, e), p, s),
where Γtake is the impulse transaction function defined from R2 × P× S× R into R2 by:
Γtake(x, y, p, s, e) =
(
x− c(e, p, s), y + e
)
,
The dynamic programming equation (DPE) associated to the control problem (3.3) is
the quasi-variational inequality (QVI):
min
[
−
∂v
∂t
− sup
(q,ℓ)∈Q(s)×[0,ℓ¯]2
Lq,ℓv + γg , v −Mv
]
= 0, on [0, T )× R2 × P× S(3.5)
together with the terminal condition:
v(T, x, y, p, s) = U(L(x, y, p, s)), ∀(x, y, p) ∈ R2 × P× S. (3.6)
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This is also written explicitly in terms of system of QVIs for the functions vi, i ∈ Im:
min
[
−
∂vi
∂t
− Pvi −
m∑
j=1
rij(t)[vj(t, x, y, p)− vi(t, x, y, p)]
− sup
(qb,ℓb)∈Qbi×[0,ℓ¯]
λbi(q
b)[vi(t, x− π
b
i (q
b, p)ℓb, y + ℓb, p)− vi(t, x, y, p)]
− sup
(qa,ℓa)∈Qai×[0,ℓ¯]
λai (q
a)[vi(t, x+ π
a
i (q
a, p)ℓa, y − ℓa, p)− vi(t, x, y, p)] + γg(y) ;
vi(t, x, y, p)− sup
e∈[−e¯,e¯]
vi(t, x− ci(e, p), y + e, p)
]
= 0,
for (t, x, y, p) ∈ [0, T )× R2 × P, together with the terminal condition:
vi(T, x, y, p) = U(Li(x, y, p)), ∀(x, y, p) ∈ R
2 × P,
where we set Li(x, y, p) = L(x, y, p, iδ).
By methods of dynamic programming, one can show by standard arguments that the
value function v is the unique viscosity solution to the QVI (3.5)-(3.6) under suitable growth
conditions depending on the utility function U and penalty function g. We next focus on
some particular cases of interest for reducing remarkably the number of states variables in
the dynamic programming equation DPE.
3.3 Two special cases
1. Mean criterion with penalty on inventory
We first consider the case as in [12] where:
U(x) = x, x ∈ R, and (Pt)t is a martingale. (3.7)
The martingale assumption of the stock price under the historical measure under which the
market maker performs her criterion, reflects the idea that she has no information on the
future direction of the stock price. Moreover, by starting typically from zero endowment
in stock, and by introducing a penalty function on inventory, the market maker wants to
keep an inventory that fluctuates around zero.
In this case, and exploiting similarly as in [2] the martingale property that Pp = 0,
we see that the solution v = (vi)i∈Im to the dynamic programming system (3.5)-(3.6) is
reduced into the form:
vi(t, x, y, p) = x+ yp+ φi(t, y), (3.8)
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where φ = (φi)i∈Im is solution the system of integro-differential equations (IDE):
min
[
−
∂φi
∂t
−
m∑
j=1
rij(t)[φj(t, y)− φi(t, y)]
− sup
(qb,ℓb)∈Qbi×[0,ℓ¯]
λbi(q
b)[φi(t, y + ℓ
b)− φi(t, y) +
( iδ
2
− δ1qb=Bb+
)
ℓb]
− sup
(qa,ℓa)∈Qai×[0,ℓ¯]
λai (q
a)[φi(t, y − ℓ
a)− φi(t, y) +
( iδ
2
− δ1qa=Ba−
)
ℓa] + γg(y) ;
φi(t, y)− sup
e∈[−e¯,e¯]
[φi(t, y + e)−
iδ
2
|e| − ε]
]
= 0,
together with the terminal condition:
φi(T, y) = −|y|
iδ
2
− ε,
These one-dimensional IDEs can be solved numerically by a standard finite-difference
scheme by discretizing the time derivative of φ, and the grid space in y. The reduced
form (3.8) shows that the optimal market making strategies are price independent, and
depend only on the level of inventory and of the spread, which is consistent with stylized
features in the market. Actually, the IDEs for (φi) even show that optimal policies do not
depend on the martingale modeling of the stock price.
2. Exponential utility criterion
We next consider as in [1] a risk averse market marker:
U(x) = − exp(−ηx), x ∈ R, η > 0, γ = 0, (3.9)
and assume that P follows a Bachelier model:
dPt = bdt+ σdWt.
Such price process may take negative values in theory, but at the short-time horizon where
high-frequency trading take place, the evolution of an arithmetic Brownian motion looks
very similar to a geometric Brownian motion as in the Black-Scholes model.
In this case, we see, similarly as in [8], that the solution v = (vi)i∈Im to the dynamic
programming system (3.5)-(3.6) is reduced into the form:
vi(t, x, y, p) = U(x+ yp)ϕi(t, y), (3.10)
where ϕ = (ϕi)i∈Im is solution the system of one-dimensional integro-differential equations
(IDE):
max
[
−
∂ϕi
∂t
+ (bηy −
1
2
σ2(ηy)2)ϕi −
m∑
j=1
rij(t)[ϕj(t, y)− ϕi(t, y)]
− inf
(qb,ℓb)∈Qbi×[0,ℓ¯]
λbi(q
b)[exp
(
− η
( iδ
2
− δ1qb=Bb+
)
ℓb
)
ϕi(t, y + ℓ
b)− ϕi(t, y)]
− inf
(qa,ℓa)∈Qai×[0,ℓ¯]
λai (q
a)[exp
(
− η
( iδ
2
− δ1qa=Ba−
)
ℓa
)
ϕi(t, y − ℓ
a)− ϕi(t, y)]
ϕi(t, y)− inf
e∈[−e¯,e¯]
[exp
(
η|e|
iδ
2
+ ηε
)
ϕi(t, y + e)]
]
= 0,
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together with the terminal condition:
ϕi(T, y) = exp(η|y|
iδ
2
).
Actually, we notice that the reduced form (3.10) holds more generally when P is a Le´vy
process, by using the property that in the case: PU(x + yp) = ψ(y)U(x + yp) for some
function ψ depending on the characteristics of the generator P of the Le´vy process. As
in the above mean-variance criterion case, the reduced form (3.10) shows that the optimal
market making strategies are price independent, and depend only on the level of inventory
and of the spread. However, it depends on the model (typically the volatility) for the stock
price.
4 Computational results
In this section, we provide numerical results in the case of a mean criterion with penalty
on inventory, that we will denote within this section by α⋆. We used parameters shown
in table (4) together with transition probabilities (ρij)1≤i,j≤M calibrated in table (1) and
execution intensities calibrated in table (3), slightly modified to make the bid and ask sides
symmetric.
Parameter Signification Value
δ Tick size 0.005
ρ Per share rebate 0.0008
ǫ Per share fee 0.0012
ǫ0 Fixed fee 10
−6
λ(t) Tick time intensity ≡ 1s−1
(a) Market parameters
Parameter Signification Value
U(x) Utility function x
γ Inventory penalization 5
ℓ¯ Max. volume make 100
e¯ Max. volume take 100
(b) Optimization parameters
Parameter Signification Value
T Length in seconds 300 s
ymin Lower bound shares -1000
ymax Upper bound shares 1000
n Number of time steps 100
m Number of spreads 6
(c) Discretization/localization parameters
Parameter Signification Value
NMC Number of paths for MC simul. 105
∆t Euler scheme time step 0.3 s
ℓ¯0 B/A qty for bench. strat. 100
x0 Initial cash 0
y0 Initial shares 0
p0 Initial price 45
(d) Backtest parameters
Table 4: Parameters
Shape of the optimal policy. The reduced form (3.8) shows that the optimal policy
α⋆ does only depend on time t, inventory y and spread level s. One can represent α⋆ as
a mapping α⋆ : R+ × R × S → A with α⋆ = (α⋆,make, α⋆,take) thus it divides the space
R
+ × R × S in two zones M and T so that α⋆|M = (α
⋆,make, 0) and α⋆|T = (0, α
⋆,take).
Therefore we plot the optimal policy in one plane, distinguishing the two zones by a color
scale. For the zone M, due to the complex nature of the control, which is made of four
scalars, we only represent the prices regimes.
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(b) near date T
Figure 3: Stylized shape of the optimal policy sliced in YS.
Moreover, when using constant tick time intensity λ(t) ≡ λ and in the case where T ≫ 1
λ
we can observe on numerical results that the optimal policy is mainly time invariant near
date 0; on the contrary, close to the terminal date T the optimal policy has a transitory
regime, in the sense that it critically depends on the time variable t. This matches the
intuition that to ensure the terminal constraint YT = 0, the optimal policy tends to get rid
of the inventory more aggressively when close to maturity. In figure 3, we plotted a stylized
view of the optimal policy, in the plane (y, s), to illustrate this phenomenon.
Benchmarked empirical performance analysis. We made a backtest of the optimal
strategy α⋆, on simulated data, and benchmarked the results with the three following
strategies:
• Optimal strategy without market orders (WoMO), that we denote by αw: this strategy
is computed using the same IDEs, but in the case where the investor is not allowed to use
market orders, which is equivalent to setting e¯ = 0.
• Constant strategy, that we denote by αc: this strategy is the symmetric best bid, best
ask strategy with constant quantity ℓ¯0 on both sides, or more precisely α
c := (αc,make, 0)
with αc,maket ≡ (Bb,Ba, ℓ¯0, ℓ¯0).
• Random strategy, that we denote by αr: this strategy consists in choosing randomly
the price of the limit orders and using constant quantities on both sides, or more precisely
αr := (αr,make, 0) with αr,maket = (ς
b
t , ς
a
t , ℓ¯0, ℓ¯0) where (ς
b
. , ς
a
. ) is s.t. ∀t ∈ [0;T ] , P(ς
b
t =
Bb) = P(ςbt = Bb+) = P(ς
a
t = Ba) = P(ς
a
t = Ba−) =
1
2 .
Our backtest procedure is described as follows. For each strategy α ∈ {α⋆, αw, αc, αr},
we simulated NMC paths of the tuple (Xα, Y α, P, S,Na,α, N b,α) on [0, T ], according to eq.
(2.1)-(2.2)-(2.3)-(2.4)-(2.5), using a standard Euler scheme with time-step ∆t. Therefore
we can compute the empirical mean (resp. empirical standard deviation), that we denote
by m(.) (resp. σ(.)), for several quantities shown in table (5).
Optimal strategy α⋆ demonstrates significant improvement of the information ratio
IR(XT ) := m(XT )/σ(XT ) compared to the benchmark, which is confirmed by the plot of
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optimal α⋆ WoMO αw constant αc random αr
Terminal wealth m(XT )/σ(XT ) 2.117 1.999 0.472 0.376
m(XT ) 26.759 25.19 24.314 24.022
σ(XT ) 12.634 12.599 51.482 63.849
Num. of exec. at bid m(NbT ) 18.770 18.766 13.758 21.545
σ(NbT ) 3.660 3.581 3.682 4.591
Num. of exec. at ask m(NaT ) 18.770 18.769 13.76 21.543
σ(NaT ) 3.666 3.573 3.692 4.602
Num. of exec. at market m(NmarketT ) 6.336 0 0 0
σ(NmarketT ) 2.457 0 0 0
Maximum Inventory m(sups∈[0;T ] |Ys|) 241.019 176.204 607.913 772.361
σ(sups∈[0;T ] |Ys|) 53.452 23.675 272.631 337.403
Table 5: Performance analysis: synthesis of benchmarked backtest (105 simulations).
the whole empirical distribution of XT (see figure (4)).
Figure 4: Empirical distribution of terminal wealth XT (spline interpolation).
Even if absolute values of m(XT ) are not representative of what would be the real-world
performance of such strategies, these results prove that the different layers of optimization
are relevant. Indeed, one can compute the ratios
[
m(Xα
⋆
T )−m(X
αc
T )
]
/σ(Xα
⋆
T ) = 0.194 and[
m(Xα
⋆
T )−m(X
αw
T )
]
/σ(Xα
⋆
T ) = 0.124 that can be interpreted as the performance gain,
measured in number of standard deviations, of the optimal strategy α⋆ compared respec-
tively to the constant strategy αc and the WoMO strategy αw. Another interesting statistics
is the surplus profit per trade
[
m(Xα
⋆
T )−m(X
αc
T )
]
/
[
m(N b,α
⋆
T ) +m(N
a,α⋆
T ) +m(N
market,α⋆
T )
]
=
0.056 euros per trade, recalling that the maximum volume we trade is ℓ¯ = e¯ = 100. Note
that for this last statistics, the profitable effects of the per share rebates ρ are partially
neutralized because the number of executions is comparable between α⋆ and αc; therefore
the surplus profit per trade is mainly due to the revenue obtained from making the spread.
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To give a comparison point, typical clearing fee per execution is 0.03 euros on multilateral
trading facilities, therefore, in this backtest, the surplus profit per trade was roughly twice
the clearing fees.
We observe in the synthesis table that the number of executions at bid and ask are
symmetric, which is also confirmed by the plots of their empirical distributions in figure
(5). This is due to the symmetry in the execution intensities λb and λa, which is reflected
by the symmetry around y = 0 in the optimal policy.
(a) N Bid empirical distribution (b) N Ask empirical distribution
Figure 5: Empirical distribution of the number of executions on both sides.
Moreover, notice that the maximum absolute inventory is efficiently kept close to zero
in α⋆ and αw, whereas in αc and αr it can reach much higher values. The maximum
absolute inventory is higher in the case of α⋆ than in the case αw due to the fact that
α⋆ can unwind any position immediately by using market orders, and therefore one may
post higher volume for limit orders between two trading at market, profiting from reduced
execution risk.
Efficient frontier. An important feature of our algorithm is that the market maker can
choose the inventory penalization parameter γ. To illustrate its influence, we varied the
inventory penalization γ from 50 to 6.10−2, and then build the efficient frontier for both
the optimal strategy α⋆ and for the WoMO strategy αw. Numerical results are provided in
table (6) and a plot of this data is in figure (6).
We display both the “gross” information ratio IR(Xα
⋆
T ) := m(X
α⋆
T )/σ(X
α⋆
T ) and the
“net” information ratio NIR(Xα
⋆
T ) :=
(
m(Xα
⋆
T )−m(X
αc
T )
)
/σ(Xα
⋆
T ) to have more precise
interpretation of the results. Indeed, m(XαT ) seems largely overestimated in this sim-
ulated data backtest compared to what would be real-world performance, for all α ∈
{α⋆, αw, αc, αr}. Then, to ease interpretation, we assume that αc has zero mean per-
formance in real-world conditions, and therefore offset the mean performance m(Xα
⋆
T ) by
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γ σ(Xα
⋆
T ) m(X
α⋆
T ) σ(X
αw
T ) σ(X
αw
T ) IR(X
α⋆
T ) NIR(X
α⋆
T )
50.000 5.283 12.448 4.064 9.165 2.356 -2.246
25.000 7.562 18.421 7.210 16.466 2.436 -0.779
12.500 9.812 22.984 9.531 20.971 2.343 -0.135
6.250 11.852 25.932 11.749 24.232 2.188 0.136
3.125 14.546 28.153 14.485 26.752 1.935 0.263
1.563 15.819 28.901 16.830 28.234 1.827 0.289
0.781 19.088 29.952 19.593 29.145 1.569 0.295
0.391 20.898 30.372 20.927 29.728 1.453 0.289
0.195 23.342 30.811 23.247 30.076 1.320 0.278
0.098 25.232 30.901 24.075 30.236 1.225 0.261
0.049 26.495 31.020 24.668 30.434 1.171 0.253
0.024 27.124 30.901 25.060 30.393 1.139 0.242
0.012 27.697 31.053 25.246 30.498 1.121 0.243
0.006 28.065 30.998 25.457 30.434 1.105 0.238
Table 6: Efficient frontier data
the constant −m(Xα
c
T ) when computing the NIR. This has simple visual interpretation as
shown in figure (6).
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Figure 6: Efficient frontier plot
Observe that highest (net) information ratio is reached for γ ≃ 0.8 for this set of
parameters. At this point γ ≃ 0.8, the annualized value of the NIR (obtained by simple
extrapolation) is 47, but this simulated data backtest must be completed by a backtest
on real data. Qualitatively speaking, the effect of increasing the inventory penalization
parameter γ is to increase the zone T where we trade at market. This induces smaller
inventory risk, due to the fact that we unwind our position when reaching relatively small
values for |y|. This feature can be used to enforce a soft maximum inventory constraint
directly by choosing γ.
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